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ARGUMENT 
I. 
WHEN VIEWING THE FACTS IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO THE PLAINTIFF, A VALID ORAL ASSIGNMENT EXISTED 
PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT 
In the appellee's brief, the Defendants improperly assert that there was 
sufficient evidence for the trial court to hold that there was not a valid assignment 
prior to the filing of the Complaint. In particular, the Defendants allege that the 
written assignment entered into between Mr. LeRoy Townsend and Mr. Steven C. 
Davis was "meant to assign a future interest and not to ratify a previous verbal 
agreement." [Appellee Brief page 7]. However, this argument fails to account for the 
fact that a valid oral assignment did exist prior to reducing the assignment to writing. 
The failure of the written assignment to make reference to the verbal assignment 
does not invalidate the oral assignment already in place. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments 
§82 (1963) states in pertinent part as follows: 
Even though the assignment is in writing the contract of the parties 
need not fully appear in writing, but may be shown by evidence 
alinude; that is the intent to assign may appear from the writing itself, 
or it may be shown alinude. 
In this matter, the record establishes that Plaintiff entered into a verbal 
assignment with LeRoy Townsend and a Complaint was was filed on August 13, 
1993 pursuant to that verbal assignment between the parties. [R. at 1-7]. The 
assignment was later reduced to writing on August 30, 1993 and ratified by the 
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Plaintiff on August 31, 1993. [R. at 363-365]. 
The Affidavit of the Plaintiff, Steven C. Davis, states in part: 
2. Before August 13, 1993, I was present with attorney Richard C. 
Coxson when LeRoy Townsend retained the legal services of 
Richard C. Coxson via telephone conversations. The terms 
and conditions were verbally agreed to between all parties 
before August 13, 1993. [emphasis added]. [R. at 407]. 
Whereas, the Affidavit of Richard C. Coxson states in part: 
1. I was originally retained in this matter by LeRoy W. Townsend 
and by Steven C. Davis to represent them and received a 
retainer fee paid by Mr. Townsend. I was aware of the 
agreement and assignment between Mr. Townsend... [R. 361; 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 
Exhibit 18]. 
Even though the Affidavits of Plaintiff and Richard C. Coxson do not 
make specific reference to a verbal assignment, the conduct of the parties in this 
matter unequivocally demonstrates that there was a verbal assignment. After the 
telephone conversation specifically referenced in the Affidavit of Plaintiff, the 
attorney, Richard C. Coxson, who was a party to the telephone conference prepared 
and filed the Complaint naming the Plaintiff as the "party in interest" based upon the 
verbal assignment between the Plaintiff and LeRoy Townsend. [R. at 1-7]. 
It is quite evident that when the facts are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, that the Affidavits of Steven C. Davis and Richard C. 
Coxson can be interpreted to provide that a verbal assignment existed prior to the 
filing of the Complaint. The trial court is required to view the evidence and every 
logical inference must be drawn in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Martin v. 
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Stevens, 243 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah). Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's 
action is obviously improper and should be overturned by this Court. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY HELD THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT THE PROPER 
PARTY IN INTEREST AND THAT 
THERE WAS AN INVALID ASSIGNMENT 
As previously outlined above, when the facts are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Plaintiff it is clear from the actions of the Plaintiff and LeRoy 
Townsend that they intended that there be a valid oral assignment. The Defendants 
allege that even if there was a valid assignment it was from Mr. Townsend in his 
personal capacity and not from Mr. Townsend in his capacity of trustee of the 
Townsend Trust. 
The Defendants further claim that the Plaintiff is barred from alleging 
that there was a valid assignment from the trust since this issue has not been 
previously addressed. However, at the hearing on this matter, Plaintiffs counsel 
specifically argued to the trial judge that there was a valid assignment and one can 
logically infer that if there is a valid assignment it must be from the proper party in 
interest. [Transcript of December 7, 1998 hearing at p.20, Ins 15-17]. Judge Stott 
required that Plaintiffs counsel only argue from the Affidavits of Plaintiff and LeRoy 
Townsend and specifically requested that Plaintiffs counsel show the court where 
the Affidavits stated there was a verbal assignment prior to the filing of the action. 
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[Transcript of December 7, 1998 hearing, at p. 20, Ins 19-20]. When a continuance 
was requested so that more of the facts surrounding the verbal assignment could be 
ascertained, the trial court improperly denied the request. 
In addition, the Defendants argue that the Pride Exploration at 798 
F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1986), case in the Plaintiffs brief is not applicable to this matter. 
[Appellee's Brief at 11]. As previously argued, assignments may be either oral or 
written and no special form is required to effectuate an assignment. In addition, as 
cited in Plaintiffs brief, assignments are construed in accordance with the general 
contract principles. [Appellant's Brief at p. 18]. See Matter of Estate of Vaughn, 588 
P.2dc 1295 (Or. App., 1979) and Horbal v. Moxharn Nat. Bank, 697 A.2d 577 (Pa 
1977). The ruling in Pride Exploration holds that it is not necessary for the grantor 
to specifically indicate the capacity in which he is conveying an interest if the whole 
of the document clearly indicates the grantor and grantee. Following this logic, the 
terms of a verbal assignment are valid if it is clear from the circumstances 
surrounding the assignment that a cause of action owned by a trust is transferred by 
an individual who is the trustee of the trust even though a specific reference is not 
made by the trustee that he is doing it in his capacity as trustee. 
In this matter, it is clear that Mr. Townsend, as trustee, assigned the 
right to this action to Plaintiff. This assignment is valid even though it may not have 
been clear from the facts alleged in the Affidavits that he was doing it in his capacity 
as trustee. The Trust in this matter correctly assigned its rights to the Plaintiff and 
the Plaintiff is the proper party in interest. In the alternative, the Court should have 
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allowed for the requested evidentiary hearing so that the parties who were in privity 
to the verbal assignment could testify as the facts surrounding the assignment. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION 
HAS RESULTED IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO THE 
DEFENDANTS; CONSEQUENTLY, EQUITY REQUIRES THAT 
THE VERBAL ASSIGNMENT UPHELD 
As argued by the Plaintiff in the Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 15] and 
at the hearing held on this matter [Transcript of December 7, 1998 hearing at p.7, In 
2], the Defendants have been unjustly enriched. They have failed to provide the 
court or even to the Plaintiff an accounting as to $250,000.00 provided to them by 
LeRoy Townsend. [R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 
6], They only argue that the Plaintiff is not the party in interest and that this action 
should be dismissed. However, due to the statute of limitations in this matter, the 
effect of the trial courts dismissal is to bar further action against the Defendants. 
Additionally, the record establishes that the Defendants are currently involved in the 
aloe business and yet they deny without providing any evidence to the contrary that 
the funds provided by Mr. Townsend have not been used in their current ventures. 
[R. at 361; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 11 ]. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. 
v. CCI Mechanical. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) as follows: 
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Before unjust enrichment may serve as a basis of recovery, there must 
be a benefit conferred on one person by another; appreciation or 
knowledge by conferee of benefit; and acceptance or retention by 
conferee of benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable 
for conferee to retain benefit without payment of value. 
The facts as established in Plaintiffs brief clearly demonstrate that the 
above referenced elements of unjust enrichment are present. The Defendant's 
received $250,000.00 from LeRoy Townsend, an 82 year man, so that they could 
establish an aloe vera business and that the only thing received by Mr. Townsend 
was a stock certificate in a defunct company that had been purchased for $5,000.00 
and was never revived by Lee Ritter. However, Lee Ritter owns an aloe vera farm 
and continue to do business in the aloe vera market. [R. at 361; Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment at p. 14]. 
Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine and as argued in Plaintiff's 
brief, an assignment can nonetheless be held valid even though the assignment may 
not be perfect at law. [Appellant's Brief at 16-17]. 
"A right to recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is 
essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is 
contrary to equity and good conscience for one person to retain a 
benefit which has come to him at the expense of another. 66 Am Jur. 
2d Restitution and Implied Contracts §3 (1963). 
Equity requires that the trial court's dismissal in this action be 
overturned and that Defendants be required to the relief demanded in the Complaint. 
In the alternative, the Plaintiff should be entitled to introduce evidence as to the 
verbal assignment. To affirm the trial court's dismissal amounts to legalized theft by 
the Defendants. 
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IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED 
THE PLAINTIFF'S CONTINUANCE 
AND/OR SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED 
FOR AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT 
PRIOR TO DISMISSAL 
In this action, the trial court took a very drastic measure and dismissed 
the Plaintiffs cause of action. This harsh ruling effectively bars either the Plaintiff or 
Mr. LeRoy Townsend from ever being able to bring suit against the Defendants for 
the recovery of the $250,000.00 paid to the Lee Ritter. Judge Stott should have 
provided for amendment to complaint prior to dismissal or allowed the Plaintiff a 
continuance rather than improperly dismissing this action. 
The Defendants argue in their brief that the Plaintiff should not be 
entitled to amend his complaint. In particular they cite Estate of Martin Haro v. Maria 
Guadalupe Haro, 887 P.2d 878 (C. App Utah) which holds that the Plaintiff lacked 
the capacity to sue and consequently the original suit was a nullity and could not 
later be amended to substitute the correct parties. 
However, the facts in this action differ from the facts in the Estate of 
Martin Maro. In this matter, the Plaintiff has the capacity to sue by way of his verbal 
assignment and therefore amendment should be allowed before the drastic remedy 
of dismissal allowed. The Plaintiff specifically requested an amendment to the 
pleadings as provided in Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R. at 361; 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at p. 29]. In addition, the request to 
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amend pleadings was requested at the hearing on this matter. [Transcript of 
December 7, 1998 hearing, at p. 9, Ins 20-21]. Furthermore, as provided in Rule 
17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff properly objected to the 
dismissal of the action and should be allowed to amend his pleadings. In the 
alternative, due to the extreme effect of the dismissal, the trial court at a minimum 
should have allowed for the requested continuance so that an evidentiary hearing 
could be held in this matter to determine the facts of the verbal assignment. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter is before the Court from a grant of Defendant's motion to 
dismiss. From the facts in this matter, it is evident that the Trial Court failed to 
consider the evidence in a light most reasonable to the Plaintiff before it dismissed 
this action. The court ignored the facts demonstrating that there was a valid 
assignment and that the Plaintiff is the proper party in interest. In addition, the Trial 
Court improperly denied the Plaintiffs motion for amendment and continuance. The 
courts improper actions prevent the Plaintiff from providing additional evidence to 
the Court as to the facts surrounding the verbal assignment. 
It is well established that the Defendants have been unjustly enriched 
since they now own a successful aloe vera business yet they have no legal 
obligation to repay the monies or provide an accounting as to where the monies 
were spent. Equity requires that the Plaintiff be awarded the relief demanded in his 
Complaint. 
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This matter should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to 
overturn Defendant's dismissal and provide for either entry of Summary Judgment in 
favor Plaintiff, further evidentiary hearing or an amendment to com/tfaint. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED^/1pth day of Nov^mher* 
HANSEN 
o^Yjnsel f ir Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of November, 1999, I caused to a 
copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Byron Smith, counsel for Defendant/Appellee herein at the following address: 
Byron Smith 
P.O. Box 1312 
Orem, UT 84059 
9 
